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1.  The Liberalization Context 
Agricultural commodity prices are volatile because short term production and consumption 
elasticities are low. Production responsiveness is low for annual crop commodities because 
planting  decisions  are  made  before  prices  for  the  new  crop  are  known.  These  decisions 
depend on expected prices and not price realizations. Price outcomes are seldom so disastrous 
as  to  result  in  the  harvest  being  abandoned.  For  tree  crop  commodities,  production 
responsiveness is low because the stock of productive trees takes between two and five years 
to  respond  to  price  increases,  because  input  application  generally  gives  only  a  modest 
increase in yield and because prices are seldom so low as to make it worthwhile to cut down 
trees which still have a productive future. Short term demand elasticities are low because the 
actual  commodity  price  will  seldom  be  a  large  component  of  overall  value  of  the  final 
product (examples are cocoa in chocolate and coffee beans in soluble coffee powder – see 
Gilbert, 2007a) and because substitutability between different raw materials is seldom large. 
Elasticities may be higher for subsistence crops in poor economies where high prices may 
force families to try to get by on less. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the variability of agricultural prices induced both 
developed and developing country governments to seek to prevent or offset these movements. 
By the 1980s unilateral and multilateral interventions in agricultural commodity markets had 
become the norm. The United States used support prices and inventories to manage domestic 
prices. The EU had a similar scheme, but also operated a special set of commodity-specific 
exchange  rates  (“green  rates”)  for  trade  among  EU  members.  For  those  commodities 
produced predominantly in developing countries, interventions were either multilateral, for 
example through buffer stock or export control agreements under the auspices of international 
commodity agreements (cocoa, coffee, natural rubber and sugar – see Gilbert, 1987, 1996) or 
through domestic agencies. Marketing boards and stabilization funds were common in both 
developed and developing countries. There were buffer stock schemes in Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and South Korea; buffer funds in Côte d’Ivoire, Papua 
New Guinea, and South Korea; marketing boards with monopolies on trade in much of Africa 
and parts of Latin America and Asia; and variable tariff schemes in Chile, Malaysia, and 
Venezuela (Knudsen and Nash, 1990).  
Many of the developing country schemes (national and multinational) encountered 
serious problems during the 1980s. Producers and producing country governments became 
over-optimistic  about  the  prices  they  could  obtain  in  what  were  generally  weak  market   2 
conditions. At the same time, the inefficiency costs associated with controls became higher 
over time as rent-seeking activities became increasingly entrenched. In coffee, high prices 
induced expansion of area in a number of countries with relatively high production costs 
(mainly in Africa), while quota restrictions held down production in lower-cost origins such 
as Brazil.  Marketing board bureaucracies, such as the Instiuto Brasiliero do Café in Brazil 
and Cocobod in Ghana, multiplied in size and absorbed much of the benefit of higher prices, 
and other forms of rent extraction were established (Bohman et al., 1996). The consequence 
was that, as prices weakened through the 1980s, almost all previously successful national 
intervention  schemes  succumbed  to  financial  difficulties.  The  international  commodity 
agreements, in turn, were unable to adapt to changes in the market, and by 1996 the economic 
clauses in them had all lapsed or failed, victims of politics and economics (Gilbert 1987, 
1996). 
  In many cases, donors were called upon to rescue or restructure national stabilization 
agencies of funds which found themselves in distress. Market liberalization, in particular the 
abolition of monopsony-monopoly marketing arrangements and radical reduction in the size 
of bureaucracies, was often a precondition for  such assistance. Thus,  a series of reforms 
aimed at liberalizing developing country agricultural markets was launched in the 1980s and 
1990s, largely at the urging of multilateral lenders such as the European Union, USAID, and 
the World Bank. Akiyama et al (2001) illustrate the rapid pace of these reforms for Africa. 
With  only  a  few  exceptions,  marketing  boards  and  stabilization  agencies  were  either 
abolished or restructured so that their activities were confined to those of general oversight, 
regulation  and  collection  and  dissemination  of  market  data.  A  major  objective  of  the 
liberalization policies was to ensure that farmers received a higher share of world prices. 
National  and  regional  monopsonies  were  largely  abolished  (an  exception  being  cotton 
through francophone West and Central Africa) and pan-national pricing was dropped. At the 
same time, export taxes tended to be reduced. Many of these changes encountered strong 
opposition from market incumbents and entrenched governmental interest groups. 
As a consequence, since the mid-1990s, agricultural products in developing country 
have been produced and marketed under much more competitive conditions than at any time 
since (or during) the colonial period. Lower taxation and greater competition in the supply 
chain have helped farmers achieve higher shares of world prices, and the price pass-through 
process has become faster. On the negative side, liberalization may also have resulted in 
lower  world  prices,  to  the  benefit  of  consumers  rather  than  producers  (see  Gilbert  and 
Varangis,  2004),  and  more  rapid  pass-through  has  resulted  in  more  variable  producer   3 
(farmgate) prices. This has been particularly true in Africa, where markets had previously 
been highly controlled, and also to a large extent in Latin America. It has been less true 
central Asia where important prices remain controlled by government. 
  More complete and more rapid pass-through of world to farmgate prices has increased 
the  exposure  of  developing  country  farmers  and  supply  chain  intermediaries  to  price 
variability. This was an unintended consequence of market liberalization (sometimes referred 
to  as  a  “second  generation  problem”)  which  has  had  particularly  serious  implications  in 
developing  countries  where  banks  have  often  poor  outreach  to  the  agricultural  sector, 
financial  markets  are  poorly  developed  and  access  to  international  markets  is  limited. 
Management  of  this  risk  becomes  a  problem  and  is  the  focus  of  this  contribution.  For 
previous literature see Claessens and Duncan (1993), ITF (1999) and Gilbert (2003). 
In the developed “market” economies, change has been less marked, particularly where 
agriculture remains largely protected. Farmers in the United States, the EU, Japan and many 
other  developed  economies  continue  to  receive  prices  well-above  world  market  levels. 
Because much of this support is delivered through price guarantees, the gap is particularly 
large  in  periods  when  world  prices  are  low.  High  prices  are  therefore  passed  through  to 
developed country farmers who nevertheless still remain partially insulated from low world 
prices. 
Section 2 of this chapter discusses price exposure in the developing country agricultural 
supply  chain.  Section  3  looks  at  the  available  risk  management  instruments,  and  the 
challenges to which they give rise. Section 4 discusses application of these instruments in the 
developing country context. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Incidence of Risk Exposure 
Agents in the agricultural value chain are exposed, to differing extents, to differing risks. In 
this section, we will be concerned predominantly with price risk. However, it is important to 
emphasize that this is not the only, and not necessarily the most important, risk faced by 
market  actors.  For  many  agricultural  commodities,  weather-related  quantity  risk  may  be 
problematic.  For  exporters  in  developing  countries,  political  risk,  in  particular  risks 
associated with the availability and terms of export permits, may be dominant. For exporters 
and banks, currency risks can be quite serious, as has been demonstrated most recently in 
countries  such  as  Zambia  and  Tanzania  which  have  experienced  currency  appreciation 
relative to the US dollar to the detriment of exporters selling commodities in US dollar terms.   4 
The justification for compartmentalizing risk into different categories (price, yield, political, 
currency etc.) and analyzing these separately is that agents need to adopt different strategies 
to manage different types of risk.  
 
2.1  Farmers  
Taking  a  simple  example  of  price  risk  in  the  coffee  supply  chain,  we  start  with 
farmers, who are naturally “long” the crop.   They benefit when prices rise and lose when 
they fall. Because intermediation costs are largely independent of the price level and because 
export and other taxes are normally constant in absolute rather than in percentage terms, price 
variations at the fob stage are attenuated at the farmgate level. Farmers obtain the residual of 
the price after all other agents in the value chain have taken their cut. As an example, suppose 
the fob price of a commodity is $1/kg and price variability measured as the coefficient of 
variation, is 15% so that a one standard deviation price movement is 15c/kg. If intermediation 
costs are 50c/kg and are constant, the same 15c/kg price movement amounts to a farmgate 
coefficient of variation of 30%. 
  Farmers are primarily interested in net revenues. Net revenues are gross revenues less 
production costs. Gross revenues are based on price multiplied by quantity (yield), and both 
are subject to volatility.  Variation in these may be partially offsetting if, for example, adverse 
weather affects many producers at the same time (as, for example, in the possible effects of 
El  Niño).  In  such  a  case,  the  farmer  is  somewhat  self-insured  since  although  yield  has 
decreased, prices have increased. This situation, however, is exceptional and in a competitive 
market with geographically dispersed production it is more plausible that yield and price risk 
are uncorrelated. 
We can identify two sets of impacts resulting from farmgate price variability. First, 
revenue variability is likely to transfer into variability of consumption, and also investment, 
including investment in new technologies. Second, price uncertainty will lead farmers to be 
cautious in the application of costly inputs and this will tend to reduce yields. 
 
   5 
 
Figure 1: The Coffee Supply Chain 
 
First,  consider  the  impact  on  consumption  and  investment.  Farmers  in  developed 
economies,  and  possibly  also  the  richer  farmers  in  developing  countries,  can  smooth 
consumption by saving and dissaving to maintain consumption equal to permanent income. 
Farmers in developing countries typically have low or zero savings and little collateral. The 
rural  areas  of  many  developing  countries  are  virtually  unbanked  and  this  inhibits  the 
accumulation of savings in good times. Even if farm households have managed to save in 
terms of agricultural capital, e.g. animals, it may be difficult to realize these savings in the 
even of an adverse shock which affects the entire community. In such circumstances adverse 
price  or  yield  shocks  will  force  poorer  farmers  to  adopt  other  strategies.  These  include 
reduction of consumption but also, in countries where other labor market opportunities are 
available, one or more family members taking an additional off-farm job or even migrating. 
In both cases, this may involve withdrawal of a child from school resulting in an irreversible 
loss of potential human capital (Duryea et al., 2007). See also section 4.7, below. 
Periods  of  low  prices  can  therefore  impose  substantial  utility  costs  on  developing 
country  farmers.  Because  adverse  shocks  are  likely  to  impact  investment  as  well  as 
consumption,  these  effects  can  be  long  term  and  can  endure  after  prices  have  recovered 
(Raddatz, 2005). The irreversibility of investment decisions implies that the effects may be 
asymmetric between positive and negative shocks and may be permanent (Collier, 2005). 
We now turn to the cost side of the equation. Production costs comprise capital, labor 
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to  another.  Some  costs,  particularly  labor  costs,  depend  on  the  quantity  harvested.  Other 
costs, particularly input costs, are incurred earlier in the crop year and, in the case of annual 
crops, at the time of planting. Short term supply responsiveness arises out of the ability of 
farmers  to  adjust  input  decisions  in  relation  to  their  expectations  of  likely  prices.  Risk 
aversion will lead farmers to reduce inputs to the extent that harvest prices are subject to 
uncertainty. Price uncertainty therefore tends to reduce yields and hence revenues. 
The  importance  of  these  yield  impacts  varies  from  commodity  to  commodity.  In 
general, we should expect the effects to be highest for annual crops where planting decisions 
can be very sensitive to expected prices. It is relatively easy, for example, for farmers to 
substitute between alternative grains. For other crops, such as cotton, which are typically 
highly fertilizer-intensive, the crucial decision is how much fertilizer to apply (and hence 
purchase). For tree crops, such as cocoa and coffee, yield responsiveness will depend on the 
extent to which production is input-intensive. Fertilizer is used in only modest quantities in 
cocoa  production  but  insecticide  application  can  be  important.  The  fertilizer-intensity  of 
coffee production varies from region to region but modern, fast-growing, varieties tend to 
require more fertilizer than traditional trees. 
Farmers  therefore  face  two  distinct  price  risk  problems.  The  first  relates  to  price 
uncertainty  over  the  crop  year:  farmers  commit  time  and  material  inputs  based  on  their 
expectations at the star of the crop year.  If prices turn out lower than they expected, they may 
fail to cover input costs, while if they are higher, they will have failed to take advantage of 
market opportunities. Managing this price risk can increase productive efficiency and, in the 
case of sharp price falls, protect against the risk of financial loss. The second problem is that 
of sustained low prices. Such periods typically result from global excess supply and, if they 
persist over a number of years, may not involve significant intra-annual uncertainty – indeed, 
prices are often less volatile when they are low. Prolonged periods of low prices undermine 
livelihoods.  This  is  an  income  maintenance  issue  and  not  a  risk  management  issue.  The 
balance  in  importance  between  these  two  factors  varies  from  commodity  to  commodity 
depending on the extent of discretion in input decisions and the length and amplitude of price 
cycles. 
 
2.2  Intermediaries, Exporters, Stockholders and Banks 
Intermediaries buy from farmers and sell either to exporters or to other intermediaries.  
They  include  low  level  traders  and  traitants,  who  tour  producing  areas  with  trucks  and 
purchase  from  farmers,  producer  groups,  cooperatives,  intermediate  aggregators  such  as   7 
transport companies, and intermediate processors such as cotton ginners, millers, etc. The 
common feature across all market intermediaries is that they both buy and sell at market-
determined prices and operate on a margin between the two.  
Like farmers, intermediaries are generally long the commodity, but they have much 
shorter price horizons. They will typically not be concerned by the overall level of prices, 
since  this  will  affect  both  purchase  and  sale  prices.  (High  prices  will  increase  financing 
requirements and may therefore constrain operations).  However, they will be concerned by 
price variability over the period (generally short) over which they hold a position. Even a 
small price fall over this period can easily completely wipe out profit margins and there is the 
danger that such trading losses can consume a significant proportion of the intermediary’s 
capital.  
Some  intermediaries  also  operate,  from  time  to  time,  by  shorting  the  commodity 
through  forward  sales  to  end  buyers.    In  these  cases,  since  the  intermediary  has  not  yet 
covered the short sale by buying the raw material, the risk is that prices will move higher. 
Exporters  are  in  a  similar  position  to  intermediaries  but  their  holding  period  will 
typically be longer reflecting transport times from the producing to the consuming market. 
Exporters  may  be  locally-based  companies,  cooperatives,  companies  based  in  consuming 
countries or local affiliates of such companies. Liberalization has resulted in many industries 
coming  to  be  dominated,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  major  multinational  companies  –  see 
section 4.1. This is true, for example, both of coffee and cocoa. Exporters will normally be 
long the commodity, although it can also happen that they are short if they sell to consumers 
prior to purchasing the product at origin. 
Stockholders are a particular category of intermediary, and they generally hold long 
positions in the market. Stocks may be held in the producing country, a consuming country or 
a third location. For many tropical commodities, there is advantage in holding stocks in a 
temperate climate. Often financing will be easier if stocks are held in warehouses designated 
for  exchange  delivery.  These  warehouses  tend  to  be  in  consuming  countries  to  allow 
consumers to take delivery for purposes of immediate consumption. Stockholders may buy 
and sell at market prices, or may simply earn a fee for storage and collateral management 
services. Stockholders in the former category, who are trading the commodity profit either 
from expected price appreciation or from the opportunity to consume (or sell to a consumer) 
should the need arise (the “convenience yield” of stock). 
Banks are a final category of intermediary with exposure. In their case, the exposure 
is indirect and results from default risk associated with lending to intermediaries with specific   8 
price exposures. A fall in the commodity price can result in inability to repay on the part of 
intermediary who is long the commodity and has borrowed in order to finance operations in 
the  supply  chain.  Once  banks  have  experienced  such  defaults,  they  become  unwilling  to 
advance credit to the sector and prefer to retreat to safer activities such as lending on urban 
real estate where collateral is available. Diminished access to credit in the supply chain and 
increased cost of credit where it is available thus become direct results of poorly managed 
price risk. 
 
2.3  Producing country governments 
Governments may have direct or indirect exposure to agricultural commodity prices. 
Direct exposure arises when tax revenues or fiscal subsidies depend on the level of prices. 
Price dependence of tax revenues is much less acute now than a few decades ago. In part, this 
is  the  consequence  of  an  extended  period  of  low  agricultural  prices  which  has  obliged 
governments to look elsewhere for tax revenues. Also, in many countries there has been a 
move to taxes which are independent of values, since quantities are more easily monitored 
than values. Direct price exposure therefore tends to be small for export crops. 
Food  crops  may  give  rise  to  more  complicated  exposure  patterns.  This  is  most 
obviously the case in countries in which government imports food, typically grains, for off-
market distribution (e.g. for use in schools and hospitals or for subsidized distribution to poor 
households as a form of social security). The same situation arises in which governments are 
committed to cap food price rises and manage strategic grain reserves. As current (2008) 
developments  in  food  markets  show,  these  commitments  will  often  be  implicit.  In  such 
circumstances, government has a short exposure: it will have an increased financial liability 
as food price rise. 
Exposure also arises indirectly when governments act, either implicitly or explicitly, 
as guarantors of stabilization funds and parastatal organizations. This has happened most 
obviously in the case of stabilization agencies, such as caisses de stabilisation. Financial 
difficulties can arise either if the stabilization agency fails to reduce prices sufficiently in the 
face of prolonged periods of low prices or if it fails to hedge a price guarantee given to 
farmers at the start of the crop year and the price then falls through the crop year. These 
circumstances have both arisen in the Central and West African cotton sectors where this 
form of market intervention is standard – see Box 1 which illustrates this for Burkina Faso. 
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A  frequent  consequence  of  financial  problems  in  stabilization  funds  is  that 
governments turn to donors to assist in the refinancing. This was the case in Burkina Faso 
(Box 1). Similarly, when parastatal organizations incur large trading losses, as a result either 
of not recognizing or mismanaging price exposure, local banks and governments are often 
called upon to support bail out programs, which can take the form of debt forgiveness or debt 
rescheduling. 
One of the objectives of market liberalization was to reduce the likelihood of such 
calls for ex post financial support by transferring responsibility for stabilization to the sector, 
in particular to so-called industry representative organizations. In practice, governments have 
difficulty in standing aside and letting a major institution fail. When industry participants 
Box 1: Governmental  Exposure to the Cotton Price in Burkina Faso 
 
Market liberalization has resulted in three cotton ginning-exporting companies in Burkina 
Faso, each with a regional monopsony. The largest is SOFITEX, the ex-state ginner which 
accounts for 80% of Burkina production. Subsequent to liberalization, SOFITEX was owned 
35% by the Burkina government, 34% by a multinational trading company and 30% by the 
cotton farmers through a producers association. In conjunction with producers, ginners fix a 
pan-national initial price to be paid to farmers in at the start of the season. This was price was 
set at over-optimistic levels in both 2004-05 and 2005-06 resulting in substantial losses to 
SOFITEX, which was unhedged. The following paragraph is a quote from the Letter of Intent 
to the IMF signed by Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Compaouré on 11 April 2007. It makes 
clear that the incidence of SOFITEX’s stabilization losses fell directly on the Burkina Faso 
government. Much of this incidence was subsequently passed through to donors. 
 
“After sizable losses in two consecutive campaigns (2004/05 and 2005/06), the net worth of 
Burkina  Faso’s  main  cotton  company  SOFITEX  was  reduced  to  below  zero.  The  main 
reasons behind the loss, based on audited accounts, were the low world cotton prices, the 
appreciation of the CFAF, and high prices paid to farmers, reflecting slow adjustment to the 
external shocks. The recapitalization was complicated by the fact that ultimately SOFITEX’s 
main  private  shareholder  decided  not  to  participate.  In  this  context,  the  government  had 
offered to extend a guarantee of CFAF 50 billion for the outstanding loans from the 2005/06 
campaign so that domestic banks would release the funds to pay farmers. The recapitalization 
need for SOFITEX is currently estimated at CFAF 38 billion. The actual amount will be 
confirmed  in  an  extraordinary  general  assembly  meeting  of  shareholders  in  June  2007. 
Shareholders must contribute at least 75 percent of the recapitalization amount by end-2007. 
The final phase, expected after 2007, would bring the company’s net worth back to a level 
compatible with regional business regulations (OHADA). The government’s 35 percent share 
in SOFITEX could temporarily increase as a result of the recapitalization.” 
 
Source: IMF http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2007/bfs/041107.pdf (paragraph 22, part) 
F.CFA 38 billion was equivalent to $79m at 2007 exchange rates. 
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know that this type of bailout is likely to be available if there is a problem, this can lead to 
reckless behavior.  More fundamentally, because many actors in the supply chain do not have 
the skills to properly assess risk in an ongoing way, and manage it throughout the season, 
unhedged  price  exposures  lead  to  trading  losses  at  every  level  of  the  chain.  Implicit 
guarantees of this sort described here result in a long exposure on the part of government, 
although  the  imprecise  nature  of  the  guarantee  makes  quantification  of  the  exposure 
problematic. 
 
2.4  Consumers 
By consumers, we intend the companies who purchase the commodity in the final 
market.  Often,  the  commodity  will  be  processed  before  being  sold  at  the  retail  level. 
Converters,  often  large  multinational  trading  companies,  import  cocoa  beans  and  grind 
(“convert”) then to obtain cocoa liquor, cocoa butter and cocoa powder which are inputs into 
the manufacture of chocolate and confectionary products. Many of these products, including 
standard retail chocolate, will contain more milk and sugar than cocoa. The cocoa value can 
therefore effectively ends at the conversion stage. By contrast, coffee is roasted and packed 
(if soluble, roast, processed and packed) but is then sold on the retail market as coffee or as a 
coffee drink. Here the value chain continues to the retail stage. In this respect, cotton is more 
akin to cocoa and sugar to coffee. 
The  price  exposure  of  consuming  companies  depends  on  how  they  sell  the  end 
product. Cocoa products are generally sold to the chocolate and confectionary industry at 
prices which closely follow exchange cocoa prices. The converters are therefore in a similar 
position to that of the producing country intermediaries. They will be long cocoa for the 
period in which they hold the cocoa for conversion. Coffee roasters buy coffee at market 
prices and sell at prices which are typically fixed over some period of time (often only a few 
weeks). They are often short coffee since they will sell first, and then focus on procurement. 
A rise in the input price, given fixed retail prices, will erode profits, and a fall will enhance 
them. Chocolate manufacturers are in a similar position relative to cocoa – a rise in the price 
of their cocoa ingredients will erode their chocolate margins. In their case, the problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that it is costly to change vending machine prices. 
Final (retail) consumers are, of course, short all commodities.  In developed countries, 
unlike agents in the commodity value chains, consumers are highly diversified. Gasoline is a 
large item in consumer budgets, but for other commodities, price rises are irritating rather 
than painful, except when they move together. This implies that final consumers will not   11 
suffer a serious decline in their standard of living if a poor harvest leads to a rise in the price 
of a particular commodity, but they will be worse off if a rise in demand (perhaps in China) 
results in an across-the-board rise in prices. In developing countries, particularly in countries 
with one or two main staple foods, consumers are not diversified and are highly exposed to 
the risk of price increases.  As we have seen recently (in 2008), when consumers of food 
staple commodities are affected by severe price shocks, the call for government intervention 
can be strong 
 
2.5  The Overall Supply Chain 
Overall,  the  value  chain  is  long  the  commodity.  Final  consumers,  and  those 
consuming companies which sell part or all of their output at fixed (list) prices, will be short. 
The more links there are in the chain, the greater the number of agents who will have long 
exposure, but the shorter the duration of their exposure. And because most supply chains are 
fragmented at least to some extent, we should expect an excess of agents with long exposure 
to those with short exposure. 
It follows that the supply chain gains if prices rise and loses if they fall. However, 
because holding periods differ, different agents will be interested in price variability over 
different horizons. Farmers have the longest horizons. The time between planting (or input 
application) and harvesting is typically around six months. Farmers are vulnerable to price 
falls over this period. Cooperatives who offer guaranteed prices at the start of the crop year 
also have long duration exposures. By contrast, most other intermediaries, such as transport 
companies, have much shorter holding periods.  
Farmers’ exposure to sort term price variability is more complex. High prices at the 
tail end of the old crop year bring no benefit to a farmer who can only sell once his new crop 
is harvested. Farmers have no exposure to variability at this stage of the crop year. However, 
once  his  crop  is  harvested  he  needs  to  decide  when  to  sell.  It  is  often  alleged  that 
intermediaries extract higher margins at the peak of the harvest (perhaps consistently with 
rising marginal costs of intermediation) giving farmers an incentive either to harvest early or 
to hold back on their sales. Discretion with respect to the time of marketing generates a short 
term exposure. 
Capital investment, either in tress or in equipment, such as in a cooperative gin, gives 
rise to a very long term exposure, extending possibly over decades. This is more akin to an 
equity investment issue rather than a risk management problem.    12 
These are the general categories of price exposure faced by actors in the supply chain.  
Specific risk assessment is necessary to identify and quantify the specific exposure faced at a 
particular time. Price risk assessment should be an ongoing exercise for all supply chain 
actors  since  the  costs  of  not  appropriately  identifying,  monitoring,  and  managing  price 
exposure can be severe. 
 
3.  Instruments and Problems 
Price risks can be managed in a number of different ways. Different agents in the supply 
chain will find different choices to be appropriate. Some developing country agents may find 
that none of these risk management methods are feasible and they may thus simply have to 
bear the exposure. Others may not be aware either of the available management methods or, 
more fundamentally, of their exposure. They may also end up bearing the exposure even in 
cases in which risk management is feasible. We discuss the instruments in section 3.1 and 
review access problems in section 3.2. Section 3.3 looks at basis risk, which may reduce the 
contribution of these instruments. Section 3.4 looks at the potential offered by developing 
country futures exchanges. 
 
3.1  Instruments 
In the developed market economies commodity price risk within a commodity chain 
is  generally  offset  using  exchange-traded  financial  products,  such  as  futures  and  options. 
(Swaps are potentially important but have not yet played a major role in developing country 
agriculture). Typically, these instruments are used to mitigate short-term price risks, say three 
- eight months forward.  
A futures contract obliges the seller, who is said to be “short” the future, to deliver a 
specified  quantity  of  the  commodity,  satisfying  a  specified  range  or  quality  conditions 
(generally including origin) in one of a range of a specified locations at or by a specified date. 
The buyer, who is said to be “long” the future, has the obligation to take delivery under the 
same terms. In the majority of cases, neither of these events will take place, and both shorts 
and  longs  will  take  exactly  offsetting  positions  in  the  same  futures  contract  prior  to  the 
specified delivery date. These offsetting positions cancel the physical delivery obligations 
and achieve the financial purpose of taking futures positions, which is generally to lock into 
the quoted futures prices at the time of the original contract when it is not possible to manage 
the  price  exposure  through  an  immediate  back-to-back  physical  contract.    The  futures   13 
contract thus achieves a “hedging” function, operating as a financial risk management tool in 
parallel with physical trades. 
In a well-functioning futures market, futures prices correlate closely with the prices in 
the physical market, and indeed generally form the benchmark prices for pricing commercial 
transactions. This correlation allows a futures position to lock in an as yet unknown future 
cash market transaction. Suppose I sell at the current futures price of $100 to fix the price in 
pending sale of the physical in one month’s time. If both the futures and the cash price fall 
over the month to $90, I will obtain only $90 on my cash sale but will profit $10 by buying 
back the futures contract at $90 against the $100 I have paid. My net price is the $100 I 
locked in through the futures sale. In section 3.3 we look at reasons why actual outcomes may 
not be so clear. 
Whereas futures contracts allow transactors to lock into current futures prices, options 
allow transactors to guarantee minimum or maximum prices. A minimum price is guaranteed 
by purchase of a put option which gives the holder the right (but not the obligation) to sell the 
physical at a specified strike price. A maximum price is guaranteed by purchase of a call 
option  which  gives  the holder  the  right  (but  not  the  obligation) to buy the physical at a 
specified strike price. 
As in the case of futures, these positions will normally be purely financial and will not 
result in the contracted purchase or sale of the physical commodity. To continue with the 
previous example, consider a put option with a strike price of $95. If the futures price falls 
from $100 to $95 over the contract period, the put option is $5 in the money and can be 
closed out for this amount. I sell my physical for $90 but make $5 on the put giving me a net 
price of $95 which is the floor price I had locked in when purchasing the option. On the other 
hand, if the futures price remained at $100, the put would expire worthless and  I would 
simply obtain the cash price of $100. The call operates in the same way but allows a purchase 
price to be capped.  
Both futures and options may be exchange instruments (i.e. instruments traded on the 
originating exchange) or over-the-counter (OTC) instruments. In the latter case, they may 
either be exchange-look-alikes or specifically designed to suit client requirements.   
The price exposures in the developing country agricultural value chains, discussed in 
section 2, establish the potential for application of price risk management instruments. Two 
sets  of  factors  reduce  the  extent  to  which  this  potential  can  be  realized  in  developing 
countries.  The  first,  access  problems,  discussed  in  section  3.2,  reduce  the  supply  of  risk 
management  instruments  to  developing  country  agents.  The  second,  basis  risk  problems,   14 
discussed in section 3.3, reduce the value of risk management instruments in developing 
countries, and hence the demand for these instruments.  
 
3.2  Access problems 
Not everyone can simply walk into a futures broker and establish a futures or options 
account. There are three major factors which can limit access: 
a)  Size: Contract sizes are often much larger than the exposure of many developing country 
actors. Furthermore, brokers incur fixed costs of trading – there is little cost difference 
between  selling  one  contract  and  ten  contracts.  Both  considerations  require  smaller 
developing country agents to aggregate their positions. 
b)  Credit:  Futures trading requires credit lines, which can be sizeable because commodity 
exchanges require daily monitoring and management of the overall financial liabilities of 
all market actors. This is done through a process of marking to market all open positions 
and then making margin calls. The mark-to-market process involves comparing the net 
value of open positions to the current market price to establish a dollar value of open 
liabilities. Futures brokers, and the exchange as a whole, then limit the overall financial 
liability of the positions by “calling” the margins of these open liabilities. This is done, on 
an individual customer basis, by requiring either a cash deposit to cover a percentage of 
the overall liability, or using a credit line to establish coverage for that liability. This 
credit line will need to be in dollars or an equivalent freely convertible currency. Since 
many developing country actors simply lack access to credit facilities needed to cover 
these liabilities, hedging with futures on international exchanges is typically infeasible. 
As an alternative, developing country can hedge with options which can be purchased by 
payment of an up-front options premium, thus avoiding the need to manage a credit line 
and margin calls. 
c)  Regulation : Post 9/11, regulatory authorities have become increasingly vigilant about the 
possibility that financial markets, including commodity futures and options, can be used 
for  money  laundering  purposes,  including  those  that  may  fund  terrorism.  Developing 
country  institutions  are  obvious  candidates  to  front  such  illegal  activities.  Developed 
country regulators now impose very substantial obligations on brokers before they can 
trade with developed country entities. These requirements relate to any type of business 
done  between  developed  country  financial  institutions  and  developing  country  market 
actors.  It implies a high start-up cost for developed country actors wishing to expand 
business in developing country markets.  If the business volumes do not appear to be high   15 
enough to offset these costs, brokers based in developed countries will simply choose not 
to invest in these new markets. (In certain developing countries, exchange regulations 
may also prohibit hedging on international exchanges). 
Overcoming  these  access  problems  is  a  challenge  to  bridging  the  market  gap  between 
unhedged commodity price risk, and the use of instruments that can mitigate that risk. 
 
3.3  Basis risk problems 
Basis risk arises where the price of a traded instrument, such as a futures price, is 
imperfectly correlated with the price that is relevant to the exposure in the supply chain. The 
prices of most exchange-traded agricultural products relate to transactions in the developed 
countries,  often  on  the  eastern  seaboard  of  the  United  States  and  in  North  Sea  ports  in 
northern  Europe.  Price  movements  in  commodity  producing  countries  will  not  always 
correlate well with these exchange prices. The resulting basis risk is therefore likely to be 
more acute for agents in the developing country sections of the agricultural value chains than 
for those in the developed country sections of the same chain for whom the US and northern 
European prices are directly relevant. 
Consider  an  intermediary  who  buys  the  commodity  on  a  particular  date,  say  7 
November, and who expects to hold this position for 14 days. He is vulnerable to adverse 
movements in the price over this two week period. He can offset this exposure by selling a 
nearby futures contract in the commodity in question with the consequence that he is now 
long the commodity and short the future. Provided the commodity price in the origin country 
moves closely with the futures market price, any fall in price which would result in a loss in 
his  physical  position  is  offset  by  a  corresponding  gain  on  his  futures  position.  On  21 
November, when he sells the intermediated product, he buys back his futures position to close 
out the original hedge. This leaves him with zero net exposure. 
The hedge quality (i.e. the extent to which the hedge does eliminate price exposure) 
depends on the correlation of changes in the local price and the futures price over this two 
week  period.  If  the  correlation  is  unity,  the  price  exposure  is  completely  eliminated.  In 
practice, hedge quality is always imperfect since the price at origin reflects local as well as 
global market conditions. The difference between the local price and the futures price is 
known  as  a  “basis”  and  the  risk  associated  with  movements  in  this  basis  (i.e.  the  price 
relativity) is known as “basis risk”. Once the correlation falls beneath around 0.8, basis risk 
becomes  large  and  offsetting  via  futures  contracts  ceases  to  be  highly  effective.  Box  2 
provides illustrative figures for Tanzanian arabica coffee.   16 
 
Box 2: Coffee Basis Risk in Tanzania 
 
Tanzanian arabica coffee is priced relative to the NYBOT Coffee “C” arabica price. Most 
coffees delivered against this contract are central American mild arabicas. The NYBOT price 
is therefore most appropriate for those coffees rather than Tanzanian coffee which is largely 
sold in Japan and northern Europe. This creates the potential for basis risk for Tanzanian 
intermediaries. 
 
Tanzania requires coffee to be sold at auctions held in Moshi at the centre of the coffee 
producing area. “Segregation” requires that exporters can only buy at auction. Auctions are 
held weekly from September to April, with occasional gaps for holidays, and biweekly at the 
end  of  the  season.  Cooperatives  and  other  intermediaries  purchase  coffee  from  farmers, 
transport it to Moshi and warehouse it there until auctioned. The consequence is that they 















Basis risk can vary with coffee grade, holding period and also from one year to another.  We 
look at basis risk for the major  grades over the seasons 2001-02 to 2006-07 for holding 
periods of 2,4,6,8, 10 and 12 weeks.. We consider hedges which, when closed out (i.e. at the 
end of the holding period) will be in the second nearby contract. Basis risk was broadly 
constant over this six year period. The correlation between NYBOT price changes and those 
in Moshi was generally highest for the six and eight holding periods and for the A, B and PB 
(peaberry) grades which are also the most important in terms of volume, where it approached 
0.8. It was lower for short holding periods and for the speciality AA and poorer quality C 
grades (in the range of 0.5-0.6). See the figure which averages the six annual correlations for 
each grade and holding period. A basis correlation of 0.8 implies a 64% variance reduction 
whereas a correlation of 0.5 reduced this to 25%. The basis correlations therefore vary from 
acceptable to poor, and are stronger for the higher grades. 
 
Data sources: DfID (Tanzanian coffee prices), ICE (NYBOT “C” prices). 
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Basis risk is lowest for commodities which conform closely to the specification for 
delivery against the futures contract, and specifically for those that conform to the “cheapest 
to  deliver”  specification  since  this  is  the  specification  which  the  futures  price  will  most 
closely reflect. Ivorian and Ugandan robusta have low basis risk relative to the Euronext 
LIFFE robusta coffee contract, Ivorian cocoa has low basis risk against the Euronext LIFFE 
cocoa contract and  central American arabicas have low basis risk relative to the NYBOT 
arabica coffee contract.. By contrast, the NYBOT arabica basis risk is less good for Kenyan 
and Tanzanian mild arabicas (see Box 2) and for Brazilian and Ethiopian unwashed arabicas. 
Similarly, West African cotton has a high basis risk relative to the NYBOT cotton contract. 
There must always be an element of judgment as to whether it is worthwhile for an 
intermediary to hedge. The vast majority of agents in developing country agricultural supply 
chains  lacks  basis  price  risk  management  knowledge  and  also  often  only  has  a  weak 
understanding of the price risks to which they are exposed.  It follows that they are often not 
well-equipped for implementing improved risk management approaches. 
 
3.4  Developing country exchanges 
Historically, the major agricultural futures markets have been concentrated in a small 
number  of  developed  economies,  of  which  Britain  and  the  United  States  were  the  most 
important. Markets have also been active in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and 
the Netherlands. More recently, futures exchanges with agricultural contracts have been are 
established in a number of liberalized developing and transition economies and economies, 
including  Brazil,  China,  Hungary,  India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Poland,  Singapore,  South 
Africa and Turkey.  
Viable futures trading in developing countries reduces basis risk and improves access 
for those actors in the supply chain located in the country in question. Developing country 
futures exchanges therefore have the potential to facilitate risk management in the developing 
world.  UNCTAD  has  played  a  leading  role  in  advising  on  these  issues  –  see  UNCTAD 
(2005a,b). However, at the same time, they can prove controversial when politicians find it 
convenient to attack futures market speculators for price changes which impact adversely in 
sections of the population, for example low coffee prices from 1999 to 2002 and the 2008 
increases in food prices. 
The most dramatic increases in agricultural futures changes that have taken place over 
the past decade are in China and India. It is probably not coincidental that these are the two 
countries with the largest domestic agricultural sectors. The majority of the active contracts in   18 
China  and  India  are  in  products  which  are  primarily  consumed  domestically  rather  than 
traded internationally. Neither country has enjoyed the same success in developing futures 
contracts for agricultural products which are already traded on a developed country exchange. 
Successful  futures  trading  requires  liquidity.  Unless  markets  can  ensure  liquidity, 
potential market participants will be reluctant to trade for fear of being unable to liquidate 
their positions except at substantial cost.  This generates a classic “chicken and egg” problem. 
Further, if two or more exchanges compete for the same business, traders will generally opt 
for the exchange with the highest liquidity and hence the lowest spread. Exchanges compete 
for liquidity and it is difficult for an entrant to attract liquidity from a successful incumbent 
contracts.  This generates “first mover advantage”. Taken to an extreme, it can imply the 
principle “one product, one contract”. 
In the case that a developing country exchange introduces a contract which competes 
with a contract on a developed country exchange, hedgers will compare the costs and benefits 
of hedging with the new contract relative to the existing contract. Market liquidity is a major 
determinant of the cost of hedging – the less liquid the market, the higher the likely spread 
and the more expensive it may be to close out a position. The new contract will have lower 
liquidity than the existing contract, at least initially, implying that choice of the new contract 
will raise costs. Against this, the new contract will be more appropriate, in terms either of 
product specification or of delivery location, for local and regional hedgers and so will have 
lower basis risk. Hedging with the new contract will therefore be associated with both higher 
costs and higher benefits than use of the existing contract. The balance between these two 
factors will determine whether the contract is attractive.  
Examples  of  successful  competition  by  developing  country  exchanges  include  the 
arabica coffee contract on the Sao Paulo exchange (the Brazilian Mercantile and Futures 
Exchange,  BM&F),  and  the  white  maize  contract  on  the  Johannesburg  exchange  (South 
African Futures Exchange, SAFEX). The BM&F arabica contract competes with the NYBOT 
contract which effectively defines the reference price for arabica coffee in world trade, while 
the  SAFEX  white  maize  contract  competes  with  the  CBOT  corn  contract  which  is  the 
reference price for world maize. However, product specifications differ in important respects. 
NYBOT  specifies  delivery  of  washed  arabica,  suitable  for  mild  coffees,  while  Brazil 
predominantly produces the more bitter unwashed arabica. Brazilian coffee therefore has a 
poor basis with respect to NYBOT. The SAFEX contract is for white maize while the CBOT 
contract is for yellow maize. Again, there is substantial basis risk, in this exacerbated by 
transport costs between North America and southern Africa, which can drive a significant   19 
wedge between prices in the two continents. Where basis risk is less serious, contracts in the 
same exchanges have performed less well (soybeans and sugar on the BM&F, yellow maize 
on SAFEX). Box 4 (section 4.6) discusses a hedging application which makes use of the 
BM&F arabica coffee contract and Box 6 (section 4.8) discusses use of the SAFEX white 
maize contracts for capping food security costs. 
   These  examples  show  that  futures  exchanges  in  developing  countries  can  play  a 
significant  role  in  facilitating  risk  management  in  developing  country  supply  chains. 
However, they will do this only if they can change the benefits between the costs and benefits 
of hedging. The additional liquidity costs of trading a new contract, which gives existing 
developed  country  exchanges  “first  mover  advantage”,  implies  that  developing  country 
exchanges are likely to be successful in contracts for domestically consumed commodities 
and for those internationally traded commodities where basis risk is large.  
 
4.  Price risk management in the developing country supply chain 
First,  in  section  4.1,  we  consider  problems  faced  by  developing  country 
intermediaries. Then, in sections 4.2 – 4.7, we consider the issues arising in intermediating 
risk management to farmers. Finally, in section 4.8, we discuss risk management on the part 
of governments. 
 
4.1  Developing country intermediaries 
Exporters and consumer-importers have mirror-image problems. The exporter sells 
the  commodity  to  the  importer  but,  because  of  distance,  the  transaction  takes  time  to 
complete. They face a choice between contracting at the price at the time of the transaction, at 
the  time  of  delivery  or  at  some  intermediate  date.  Typically,  the  price  will  be  fixed 
formulaically at the time of the transaction against the price of the relevant futures contract at 
the time of delivery.  
To be concrete, consider the case of a Kampala (Uganda) exporter selling robusta 
coffee to an importer, a roasting company in Hamburg (Germany). It takes two months to 
transport the commodity from the Kampala railhead to Hamburg. In a back-to-back sale for 
his own account, the importer manages the price risk by contracting the purchase (from the 
exporter) and the sale (to his end consumer) at the same time. He offers the exporter a price 
based on the current futures market quotation for a month close after the expected delivery, 
e.g. March for a February delivery, plus a negotiated quality premium or discount. He then 
immediately contracts the sale of the processed coffee with a similar price basis, e.g. March   20 
futures price for a February delivery, plus a negotiated premium. The importer has eliminated 
his  exposure  but  the  exporter  bears  the  price  risk  between  the  transaction  date  and  the 
delivery date.   
Large exporters or importers, in particular multinationals, will monitor a portfolio of 
transactions on a regular basis and will be able to quantify, to the dollar, the exact price 
exposure of the overall position. They will typically use futures markets to hedge only their 
net  positions  since  they  can  benefit  from  internally  offsetting  long  and  short  positions. 
Relative size is therefore one component in comparative advantage. A second component is 
access to finance, required for margin payments – in the event that the futures price rises, the 
short party will need to pay margin into the exchange to maintain his position. As discussed 
above  in  section  3.2,  this  will  be  difficult  for  a  small  exporter  located  in  a  developing 
country. 
These factors place developing country exporters, particularly small exporters, at a 
disadvantage  relative  to  multinational  exporters,  or  local  companies  affiliated  to 
multinationals. At the time of the push for market liberalization, there was a widespread hope 
that  national  monopsony-monopoly  exporters  would  be  replaced  by  a  competitive  export 
sector. This has not happened. Instead, after an initial burst of competition, exporting has 
generally tended to become quite concentrated and to be dominated by multinationals. It was 
also imagined that cooperatives would be able  to export directly. Again, this has proved 
difficulty except in niche markets (such as those for organic produce) and in the concessional 
trade (such as “fair trade”). Locally-based traders naturally ask why they cannot be involved 
as principals in the export of their own crops. The answer is that, absent developed financial 
market institutions which can provide credit and finance risk management, liberalization has 
allowed local firms the right to compete but has failed to level the playing field such that they 
can compete effectively. 
Stockholders have a long exposure, analogously with exporters, and can hedge in the 
same way. Once they have bought, or contracted to buy, the commodity, they sell futures. If 
the stockholder intends a long holding period, he will choose a distant future, subject to it 
being  sufficiently  liquid.  By  so  doing,  he  has  locked  in  the  market  “contango”  –  the 
difference between the long-dated futures and the cash price he has paid for his physical. 
When, eventually, he sells the inventory, he unwinds the futures position by purchasing the 
same contract. The complication is that, if he chooses to hold his physical position beyond 
the maturity date of his short futures contract, he will need to roll this position forward, 
buying back the future as it comes to maturity and selling a further longer-dated contract. If   21 
the  contango  increases,  this  will  be  profitable,  but  if  it  declines  he  will  lose  money. 
Management of “roll risk” provides opportunities for profitable trading and has the potential 
to reduce hedging costs. However, when roll risk is mismanaged, this can increase costs and 
reduce hedge effectiveness. 
Commodity futures markets function well for the export and import trade – hardly 
surprising,  since  this  was  the  function  they  evolved  to  serve.  They  also  facilitate 
stockholding. As financial instruments, futures can in principle provide the same benefits to 
developing  country  supply  chain  that  they  currently  provide  in  developed  economies. 
However,  the  consequence  of  uneven  access  is  that  they  are  instrumental  in  shifting  the 
balance  of  advantage  in  commodity  exporting  towards  multinationals  and  against  locally 
based traders. 
Other developing country intermediaries, such as traitants and transport companies, 
also have long exposure albeit over relatively short periods of time. In principle, they might 
also hedge their exposure. In practice, this proves difficult for reasons both of market access, 
discussed in section 3.2, and because of basis risk, discussed in section 3.3. Basis risk makes 
hedging less effective and access problems, make it more difficult. The result is that the 
majority of developing country supply chain intermediaries generally manage their risk by 
minimizing holding times. This strategy is reasonably effective provided there are no sharp 
falls (downward jumps) in prices. The strategy becomes dangerous if holding periods are 
long. This can happen if the intermediary undertakes substantial processing, as is the case 
with cotton ginners, if it is inefficient (true of many cooperatives) or if it decides to speculate, 
waiting on a possible price rise (also a common practice among cooperatives). 
 
4.2  Farmers: risk management versus price stabilization 
Farmers are always long the commodity. However, as discussed in section 2.1, they 
have two distinct time horizons. The shorter horizon is the crop year. To commit inputs, they 
need to be assured of the price at harvest. The longer horizon relates to investment, either in 
trees  (cocoa,  coffee  etc.),  in  capital  equipment  or  in  cooperative  facilities.  The  relative 
importance of these two horizons differs across commodities. 
Hedging is, in principle, possible with respect to the shorter horizon but will never be 
effective  in  relation  to  the  longer  term  problem.  One  of  the  misconceptions  of  the 
liberalization  agenda  was  that  “market-based  risk  management”  could  substitute  price 
stabilization  –  in  fact  the  two  approaches  address  price  variability  at  different  horizons. 
Importantly,  stabilization  does  not  eliminate,  and  may  exacerbate,  risk  management   22 
problems. Marketing boards and like organizations hoped that, by stabilizing prices, they 
would be able to commit on harvest prices at the start of the crop year. That transferred the 
short term price exposure from the farmers to the board. The risk still needed to be managed.  
Despite the fact that it has seldom been emphasized, the distinction between price 
stabilization  and  price  risk  management  is  fundamental  –  see  Gilbert  (2007b).  This  is 
because,  as  already  stressed,  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  activities  differs  across 
different agricultural commodities, and because, if these problems are to be addressed, it will 
in general be appropriate for this to be undertaken by different institutions.  Risk management 
is concerned with locking in prices, and hence profits, at the time decisions are made while 
stabilization addresses the level of prices, and hence profits, that can be locked in. Put another 
way, risk management is a contracting activity while stabilization is an activity which relates 
to saving. 
 
4.3  Intermediation via cooperatives 
  Even  in  the  developed  economies,  very  few  farmers  directly  hedge  using  futures 
markets. In the developing countries, even fewer farmers are able to do this, even if they 
understand  what  it  would  be  to  hedge.  This  was  always  recognized  by  the  advocates  of 
market-based  risk  management,  who  looked  for  intermediaries  which  might  function  as 
“transmission mechanisms” – see ITF(1999). The analogy was to elevator companies in the 
North American grains sector which offer a variety of contractual price fixing arrangements 
to farmers. Once a farmer chooses to lock in a price, thereby passing the price exposure to the 
elevator company, the elevator, which benefits from aggregation and from superior access to 
credit,  hedges  the  position  on  a  net  basis.  Possible  developing  country  transmission 
intermediaries include cooperatives, banks and exporters. 
  Cooperatives have the size to aggregate. They buy the commodity from farmers and 
sell to exporters, perhaps after some processing. They may also export directly, but in many 
markets, they will lack the scale and specialized expertise to do this efficiently. They may 
also supply inputs to farmers at the start of the crop year, in general on a credit basis with 
repayment taken as a rebate on the eventual purchase price. In principle, cooperatives might 
sell the product forward or establish a short futures position enabling them to offer farmers a 
fixed price at the start of the crop year. This would give the farmers the security they require 
in deciding what quantities of inputs to purchase and how much labor time to supply. 
  This  is  a  pure  risk  management  activity  and  does  not  involve  any  element  of 
stabilization. With storage, futures prices are only very slightly less variable than cash prices   23 
– see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). In a year in which prices start low, a futures sale will lock 
the  cooperative  into  this  low  price.  The  advantage  that  this  gives  is  that  farmers  do  not 
unwittingly purchase inputs which the sales price will not justify. However, they may well 
remain highly discontented with the price that has been fixed and doubt the wisdom of the 
forward or futures sale. 
  Similarly to other intermediaries in the commodity supply chain, developing country 
cooperatives lack the foreign currency credit to organize margin finance, but also because of 
regulatory concerns with regard to money laundering – see section 3.2. If they are to hedge 
this must therefore be through purchase of out-of-the-money puts. This will give them an 
approximate minimum price and not to fix their price absolutely. The requirement to pay an 
up-front premium, often seen as a disadvantage of non-margined options relative to futures, 
forces  cooperatives  to  put  a  value  on  price  security.  With  futures  sales,  these  costs  only 
become  explicit  if  there  is  a  price  rise  during  the  course  of  the  crop  year  at  which  the 
cooperative perhaps belatedly discovers it has foregone. 
  The institutional structure of cooperatives allows them to manage minimum prices 
relatively easily by utilizing a two stage payment structure. The initial payment, guaranteed 
to the cooperative’s members at the start of the crop year, is based on the minimum price 
locked in either through the purchase of the put, less the premium cost, or on the basis of 
fixed price forward sales contracted prior to the crop year. If, at harvest, the cooperative 
achieves a higher price than that promised at the start of the crop year, a second payment can 
be made. 
  As discussed in section 3.2, it is not feasible for developing country cooperatives to 
access international commodity futures markets. Few major banks and brokers are willing to 
invest in building-up relationships with developing country cooperatives and to work with 
them to overcome regulatory hurdles. There are also practical problems at the level of the 
cooperatives  themselves,  particularly  in  Africa  where  cooperatives  have  often  become 
inefficient  and  over-politicized  over  time.  Many  have  proved  insufficiently  sophisticated 
from  a  financial  and  accounting  standpoint  to  use  financial  markets.  Slow  democratic 
decision-making results in hedge quotes becoming stale, and cooperatives have not always 
been  willing  to  delegate  power  to  contract  to  officers.  It  has  been  observed  that  while 
cooperatives often welcome technical assistance and apparently benefit from the improved 
contracting that this generates, they have seldom been able to continue to manage risks with 
the same competence once the assistance programs terminate.    24 
One should not be too negative about this experience: farmer cooperatives work well 
in certain regions of the world (the Netherlands and parts of northern Italy, for example) and 
less well in others. It is important to understand what leads to success and what inhibits it so 
that  developing  country  cooperatives  can  be  reinforced  wherever  circumstances  are 
propitious. If this can happen, these cooperatives may yet be able to securely offer farmers 
some element of price guarantee at the start of the harvest year. 
 
4.4  Intermediation via exporters 
Exporters might in principle offer farmers or cooperatives fixed prices or minimum 
prices in the same way as that outlined in the section 4.3. They have an incentive to do this if 
the  pre-announced  prices  increase  output  sufficiently  such  that  the  resulting  increased 
revenue  outweighs  the  costs  of  making  these  commitments.  Moreover,  multinational 
exporters, or local exporters affiliated to multinationals, have the capacity to manage the 
credit and regulatory constraints that confront local organizations, such as cooperatives, in 
operating on international futures markets. 
To some extent, exporters do operate in this way. The main practical limitation they 
face is that of contract enforcement. Where farmers have a choice of to whom they will 
deliver, fixed price contracts, in practice, become free options – if the market offers a higher 
price than the contracted price, many will choose to deliver at most only a part of their output 
against the contract, whereas if the contracted price exceeds the market price, the exporter 
will find he obtains 100% of the contracted output. The same logic makes it difficult for 
exporters to offer input credit financed through a rebate on the eventual purchase price – this 
simply gives an incentive to farmers to deliver to alternative purchasers, a common problem 
known as “side-selling.”  
Competition therefore undermines the ability and willingness of exporters to provide 
risk management services. The liberalization agenda failed to appreciate this difficulty. The 
consequence is that it is only in the relatively less liberalized markets that exporters are able 
to transmit risk management (i.e. guaranteed prices) to farmers. Coffee and cocoa both tend 
to be very competitive. Traitants and small traders tour round farming communities offering 
farmers  multiple  opportunities  to  sell  and  hence  also  to  break  previous  contractual 
commitments. By contrast, the cotton sector, particularly in francophone Africa, has tended to 
preserve  regional  monopsonies  reflecting  the  high  fertilizer  intensity  of  most  cotton 
production and the costliness of transporting bulky unprocessed (seed) cotton over significant 
distances. In cotton, economic efficiency appears best to be served through a collaborative or   25 
symbiotic relationship between regional ginners (often cooperatives) and the farmers who 
supply  them,  even  though  this  results  in  less  competitive  pressure.  The  same  type  of 
dependency arises in both the cane sugar and the palm oil industries. In these circumstances, 
exporters are in a position to offer price security without worrying to the same extent whether 
they will subsequently be undercut by competitors provided that they can manage the price 
risk that they thereby assume. Facilitation of risk management at the export stage allows the 
benefits of price security to be transmitted down the supply chain. 
 
4.5  Intermediation via banks 
Banks  form  a  further  set  of  potential  candidates  for  intermediation  of  price  risk 
management to farmers, either directly or via cooperatives, but only to the extent that they are 
active in the sector in question. This excludes many of the poorest countries of the world 
where banks have seen little profit in an (until recently) stagnant agricultural sector and have 
thus tended to eschew both the agricultural sector in general and lending to farmers and 
agricultural cooperatives in particular.  
The potential for banking involvement arises from their concern to avoid default in 
loans to farmers or farm cooperatives. Such defaults are most likely in periods in which 
prices are low, or, even if not low in absolute terms, have fallen during the course of the crop 
year. Two alternative strategies are available to banks. The first is to hedge their exposure 
directly, by, for example, purchase of puts which pay off in precisely the circumstances that 
defaults  become  more  likely.  The  second  possibility  is  to  gear  the  repayment  terms  on 
agricultural lending to the commodity price in question so that lower repayments are required 
if prices turn out to be poor. These lower repayments would need to be compensated by 
higher repayments in other circumstances, but the lower default risk may yet allow them to 
offer attractive loan contracts to borrowers.  This mechanism would create price exposure for 
the bank, which would then need to hedge itself.  
Box 3 illustrates intermediation of this sort in the context of Tanzanian cotton and 
coffee  sectors.  In  the  current  more  buoyant  context,  it  is  possible  that  there  will  be  an 
increased  appetite  for  agricultural  lending,  and  these  ideas  may  become  more  widely 
exploited.  Box  4  discusses  the  innovative  Brazilian  Cedula  Produto  Rural  instrument  in 
which  commercial  bank  financing  for  coffee  exports  is  facilitated  by  the  locally  traded 
arabica coffee contract. This is an interesting model for other developing countries wishing to 
increase the availability of export finance.   26 
Box 3: Risk Management Intermediation by a Tanzanian Agricultural Bank 
 
CRDB Bank Ltd is one of two Tanzanian commercial banks with a significant role in coffee 
and cotton financing.  In 2001, CRDB was faced with default issues in the coffee and cotton 
sector both of which were experiencing exceptionally low prices. Rather than pulling out of 
these sectors, the bank choose to implement a collateral management program which would 
help it to exert tighter control on lending to these high risk sectors.  The process begins 
when the client brings the goods to the certified warehouse or curing company.  Once the 
collateral manager had evaluated the quality and the quantity of the product, it sends a 
report to the bank. The bank values the inventory based on then current market prices and 
advances 65% of the cash value to the client.   
 
This leaves CRDB Bank bearing a long price exposure. It could either hedge the overall 
portfolio to the coffee and cotton price by using risk management instruments to manage 
price volatility on its financing flows, or hedge its own exposure through that of individual 
clients by offering to act as a market intermediary in carrying out hedging transactions on 
behalf of borrowers. It chose the second option because it wished to expand services to 
agricultural borrowers and because it was concerned about adding on costs that are not 
entirely understood by customers and run the risk of being perceived as “hidden”.  
 
CRDB Bank adopted the Swahili term “Kinga Ya Bei” (roughly translated as commodity 
price  protection).    The  program  was  introduced  at  the  annual  borrower  workshops  for 
coffee and cotton in 2004. Since that time coffee prices have recovered and cotton is also 
somewhat higher. Attention has now shifted to currency risk. Attention has now shifted to 
currency risk. The bank continues to provide assistance to borrowers in the assessment of 
price  risk  throughout  the  season  by  helping  them  to  analyze  their  positions  against  the 
market, assess break-even price levels and mark positions to market. 
 
This summary is based on material provided by Erin Bryla, Julie Dana, Roy Parizat and 
Pauline Tiffen. 




4.6  Insurance as an alternative? 
From time to time, well-meaning commentators suggest that insurance might be a 
mechanism  by  which  developing  country  farmers  and  intermediaries  might  manage 
Box 4: The Brazilian Cedula Produto Rural   
 
The Cedula Produto Rural (CPR) is an innovative instrument designed for the agricultural sector. It 
is essentially a commodity-backed bond, issued by a farmer or cooperative and discounted by a 
bank. It is used extensively to finance coffee exports. 
 
The CPR structure has three features: 
·  Stabilization: it guarantees farmers a minimum local currency cost-based price which varies 
only moderately from year to year. 
·  Risk management: It gives farmers protection against movements in prices and exchange rates 
over the course of the crop year. 
·  Finance: It provides producers with low cost finance at an early stage in the crop year. 
 
There are four important sets of actors in the structure: 
1.  The Bolsa Brasiliera de Marcadorias (BBM) is the Brazilian physical commodity market. The 
BBM started out as a market for physical agricultural crop products. It has now evolved into 
being  an  internet-based  market  for  financial  products  for  the  agribusiness  sector.  It  issues 
CPRs, organizes a secondary market in these instruments and is responsible for implementation 
of government minimum price policies. The CPR requires the farmer to deliver a specified 
quantity  of  coffee  of  specified  minimum  quality  to  one  of  a  number  of  designated  BBM 
warehouses by a specified date.  The value of the CPR depends on the lower of the minimum 
price and the current futures price (at the delivery date), translated into local currency at the 
forward exchange rate. 
2.  Commercial banks discount CPRs from coffee farmers with good credit histories. This provides 
relatively low cost finance for the important coffee export business. The Banco do Brasil plays 
a dominant role in this provision. The Banco do Brasil is a public-private partnership in which 
government maintains a large influence and which has an extensive branch network in the 
coffee-producing areas. 
3.  Private investment institutions buy discounted CPRs on the BBM secondary markets. If the 
price is too low (i.e. the futures price is below the support price), the CPRs are retained by the 
Banco do Brasil which may therefore be seen as a market maker in CPRs. 
4.  The Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F) trades dollar-based futures contracts 
in arabica coffee and contracts on the Brazilian rais exchange rate. Importantly, the BM&F 
contract specifies delivery is to BBM warehouses eliminating basis risk for institutions hedging 
CPRs on the BM&F. This increases the attractiveness of hedging on the BM&F relative to 
NYBOT, despite NYBOT’s greater liquidity.  When investment institutions buy CPRs, they 
typically take on an offsetting short position in BM&F futures and a long position in dollars. 
In summary, the structure involves a government agency (the BBM), commercial banks of which 
one acts as a market maker, private sector investment institutions and a local futures market (the 
BM&F).   28 
agricultural price risk. In fact, insurance is ineffective in dealing with agricultural price risks 
although it can be used for weather risk.  
Economists tend to discuss the failure of insurance markets in terms of moral hazard 
(not locking your front door because you have full contents insurance) and adverse selection 
(couples who wish to purchase insurance against the birth of twins disproportionately have 
twins in their family histories). Neither of these issues arises with price insurance. Instead, 
there are two other problems. First, the entire supply chain experiences price falls at the same 
time, so there is no risk pooling. Second, the price distribution varies over time making it 
difficult to calculate actuarial probabilities 
Risk pooling arises when individual risks are largely uncorrelated across a population. 
The fact that one person dies from a heart attack does not change the risk for any of the other 
persons insured. Absent moral hazard and adverse selection, this lack of correlation allows 
the insurance company to rely on the Central Limit Theorem which states, loosely, that the 
average incidence of a particular problem in a given sample will tend, as the sample size 
increases, to be normally distributed with variance inversely proportional to the sample size. 
If  probabilities  remain  constant  over  time,  this  fundamental  result  allows  insurance 
companies to predict their average payout per policy with considerable accuracy even though 
they have no means of predicting the payout on a particular policy. 
The Central Limit Theorem relies on independence. It fails when all or a large group 
of insureds suffer at the same time. An example is a disaster such as an earthquake in Los 
Angeles. A fall in a commodity price is similar – most agents in the supply chain have a long 
exposure and all of these will lose when prices fall. Lack of risk pooling makes insurance 
unattractive to the provider. 
Non-constancy of probabilities makes it difficult for insurers to offer price insurance. 
Like  many  economic  events,  commodity  price  changes  depend  in  a  complicated  way  on 
history. Suppose we believe price changes to be log-normal, i.e. the changes in the logarithms 
of prices are normal. This ignores fat-tail (kurtosis) problems but is convenient since the 
mean and variance are sufficient statistics for the normal distribution – if we know these two 
statistics, we know everything. In the presence of a futures market for the commodity, we 
might suppose that statistical arbitrage will ensure that the futures price is a near unbiased 
estimate of the mean of the distribution. However, the variance of the distribution will depend 
on stock levels, on the price itself (governments often impose export restrictions when prices 
are high) and on the likely variability of production and consumption, which will also be 
time-varying. We might in principle attempt to estimate these variances from the implied   29 
volatilities on options markets but, in agriculture, these are seldom sufficiently accurate to be 
reliable. If we cannot characterize the variance, estimation of tail probabilities (which is what 
will be insured) becomes impractical.  
 
 
Box 5: Weather Insurance in Malawi 
 
Approximately 50,000 thousand small-scale farmers in Malawi receive agricultural credit 
for purchasing seed, fertilizer or related agricultural inputs each year. While banks profess 
an interest in expanding agricultural credit to small-scale farmers, in practice, agricultural 
loan portfolios are declining. A major reason is defaults arising out of crop loss through 
either inadequate rainfall or flooding. 
 
Rainfall risk is endemic  in  Malawi. In  2004-05, the country experienced a devastating  
drought  throwing  40%  of  the  smallholder  population  into  dependence 
on food aid. Subsequent  harvests  have  been  better  but  in  each  year  there  have  been 
pockets of drought in a few areas. Other areas were affected by flooding 
 
An  index-based  weather insurance policy provides a means to offset the weather related  
risks   of   providing   credit   to   a   farmer. The  policy  links  possible  insurance payouts  
with  a rainfall index calibrated with the rainfall needs of the  crop  being insured. The 
main advantage of this index-based approach is the payout is not based on the condition 
of the crop per se, but on the indisputable rainfall  record.  A limiting factor however is 
that it requires that farmers to be situated close (in practice within 20 km) to a rainfall 
station with reliable communications and good historical data. 
 
In  2005,  the  Insurance  Association  of Malawi (IAM) agreed to offer an index based  
weather   insurance   policy,   linked   with   credit   supply,  to  small-scale  farmers. Two  
banks  agreed  to  offer  the insurance backed loans to groundnut producers operating  
under   the   auspices   of  the  National  Association  of  Small  Farmers  of  Malawi 
(NASFAM). The Malawi Meteorological Services Department agreed to provide daily  
historical  rainfall  data  and  daily  data  from  the  forthcoming  rainfall  
seasons. Together with a  rainfall-based  groundnut crop model the historical  data  was  
used  to  design the index-based insurance contracts. The World Bank provided technical 
assistance  in  developing  the  rainfall  index  and contracts,  drafting  the  index-based 
insurance policy, monitoring the pilot and brokering the full array of partnerships. 
 
The index-based insurance contracts piloted so far in Malawi cover the value of the  input  
loan, not the crop. If there is drought, the insurance payout repays part of  all of the costs 
of the loan. Insofar as the risks of loan default are reduced,  the costs of  credit  should  
decline and banks should be willing to extend  larger  quantities  of  credit  to  more  
farmers.  In 2007 and 2008 the program  scaled  up  to  include  excess  as  well  as deficit 
rainfall  risk  for  tobacco,   paprika,   tea   and  coffee  farmers  working  with  several 
agribusinesses, contract farming companies and banks in Malawi. 
 
Based on work by Erin Bryla, David Rohrbach and Joanna Syroka. 
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In  practice,  an  insurance  company  wishing  to  offer  price  insurance  would  very 
probably choose to offset its position on an organized futures market. It is possible that this 
may  be  an  efficient  way  to  intermediate  access  to  futures  markets,  but,  since  insurance 
companies are currently absent from the agricultural supply chain, it is more likely that this 
will  simply  an  additional  level  of  costs.  The  two  different  markets  –  insurance  and 
commodity futures markets – have different regulatory structures as well, and the regulatory 
implications make it difficult to offer products structured through some combination of the 
two. 
Contrast price insurance with yield insurance, which is practical. Insurance companies 
will not offer insurance on the yield on a particular farm since this generates a clear incentive 
to the farmer to reduce effort (moral hazard). However it is practical to offer insurance on the 
yield in a well-defined administrative area, if this can be measured, since an individual farmer 
will have a negligible impact on overall yield. Where yield variability arises from adverse 
weather conditions, one can define the payout in terms of the weather at a specified (secure) 
weather station, or in terms of an index over a number of such stations. Weather is generally 
fairly local, so insurance companies can pool across a range of geographically separate areas, 
and probabilities, even if not completely constant, tend to evolve slowly over time. Weather 
insurance is already extending from the developed to the developing world – see Box 5. 
 
4.7  Risk-coping strategies 
Developing  country  farmers  have  developed  their  own  mechanisms  to  deal  with 
hardships. It is useful to distinguish here between ex ante risk management strategies and ex 
post “risk coping” strategies. The most important ex ante strategy is income diversification, 
including  crop  diversification.  Ex  post  strategies  include  borrowing,  sale  of  assets,  risk 
pooling  through  informal  insurance  arrangements  between  individuals  and  entire 
communities, increasing labor supply to the market and possibly even migration.  
Risk management and risk coping strategies both impose costs. First consider ex ante 
risk management strategies. The challenges and preconditions for successful diversification 
programs have been thoroughly investigated (see, for example, Jaffee, 1993, and Barghouti et 
al., 1990). Poor households are inhibited from entering into riskier higher return activities 
because the downside risks are simply too great in the event of a crisis. Crop diversification 
increases security in the face of possible price and weather shocks but at the expense of 
allowing  farmers  to  benefit  from  scale  and  specialization.  The  choice  of  safe  but  less   31 
profitable choices can result in negative long term consequences (Morduch, 1990; Alderman 
and Paxson, 1994; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). 
Turning to ex post risk coping strategies, richer households can borrow more easily in 
periods of low prices because they have assets that are available as collateral. If credit is not 
available, they can smooth their income by selling assets. In contrast, poorer households need 
to adopt low risk, low return strategies. Informal insurance arrangements appear effective in 
relation to demographic shocks, such as illness and death, but are less effective with price in 
coping with risks since low prices will impact all the farmers in a monoculture community. 
The problem of shock-induced inefficient choices can arise also with ex post strategies that 
deal with the consequences of shock; for example requiring children to drop out of school or 
to work may have long-term consequence and be socially inefficient (de Janvry et al., 2006). 
Sale of productive assets to maintain consumption may result in lower future incomes. Short 
run income maintenance may therefore be at the expense of longer-term well-being.  
The fact that farmers are already diversified reduces their demand for more formal 
price risk management tools – effectively, they have already eliminated a large part of the 
price risk that market methods seek to address. Indeed, if reliable price risk management tools 
were available to farmers at low cost, this would allow them to specialize, i.e. undiversify, 
since the price risk would now be sustainable. It follows that if successful intermediation 
does become possible, for example through strengthened cooperatives, one should expect the 
take-up  to  be  gradual  with  farmers  moving  towards  more  specialized  and  larger  scale 
production as the perceived familiarity of the market-based structures increases with use. 
 
4.8  Governments 
We saw in section 2.4 that governments may have either a long or a short exposure 
depending on the crop, the tax system and the nature of the explicit and implicit commitments 
into  which  they  have  entered.  First  and  foremost,  it  is important  that  governments  make 
themselves aware of their exposure so as to avoid unpleasant surprises – there is always a 
tendency to hope that things work out and an unwillingness to confront problems until they 
become serious. Risk management is the antithesis of this approach. 
In  the  case  of  tax  revenues  arising  where  the  exposure  is  to  export  prices, 
governments have a long exposure which they can, in principle, hedge by selling futures. 
Governments  are,  of  course,  always  subject  to  tax  and  expenditure  shocks.  They  will 
normally retain a reserve to deal with these. Active risk management becomes necessary 
when the size of the shocks is large relative to other shocks and the size of the reserve.   32 
Typically, governmental exposure to export prices is not of this order of magnitude. In the 
event that they do decide to hedge, governments of poor countries may face many of the 
same  difficulties  in  accessing  futures  as  do  intermediaries  in  the  local  supply  chain.  In 
particular, they may find that credit issues oblige them to buy options rather than hedge with 
futures.  
The short exposure arising out of commitments on staple food crops can give rise to 
more substantial exposure, in particular in the event that food prices spike up very sharply, as 
has happened in 2008. Government often finds itself offering a more or less explicit price 
cap. Traditionally, food security has tended to be underwritten by food reserves. However, 
this  approach  is  costly  in  terms  of  the  capital  tied  up  in  the  reserve,  deterioration  and 
bureaucracy.  Currently  many  governments  are  subsidizing  the  price  of  food  staples  for 
consumers. These policies are also costly, and may not be sustainable over time. 
The alternative approach is to use financial risk management instruments. Prices caps 
of this sort are naturally hedged by purchase of out-of-the-money call options which, ignoring 
basis risk issues, pay off in exactly the circumstances that the government’s guarantee is 
required. By purchasing a call, government is essentially asking the market to store on its 
behalf.  This  should  result  in  savings  if  food  shortages  are  imperfectly  correlated  across 
countries, so that the same stock can be available for the entire market, and if international 
markets can store more cheaply. Dana et al (2006) discuss policies of this sort in relation to 
Malawi and Zambia. 
The disadvantage of the market approach is that stocks are distant from the point of 
consumption and it will be expensive in terms of time and transport costs to bring them to the 
consumers. Transport facilities may be quite limited in landlocked countries, and even in 
other countries, ports may be congested. A large jump in transport requirements is likely to 
result in a corresponding jump in transport costs, which will not easily be hedged. Box 6 
looks at a contingent food security import contract backed by on OTC call option which 
secured both the grain price and the transport facilities in order to ensure timely delivery of 
grain  at  a  capped  price.  We  suggest  that  this  approach  to  food  security  has  enormous 
potential.  If  it  had  been  widely  implemented  in  2007-08,  many  of  the  food  price  and 
availability  problems  currently  afflicting  poor  food-importing  countries  could  have  been 
avoided at quite modest cost.  
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Box 6: Use of Call Options for Contingent Food Security Imports 
 
In 2005-06, Southern Africa experienced a severe drought-related food shortage. Affected 
countries included Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. During a food shortage 
maize prices typically increase, thus exacerbating the risk of hunger. In the past, governments 
have attempted to manage this problem by subsidizing the price of maize but such responses 
tend  to  have  a  large  cost  both  financially  and  in  terms  of  negative  impact  on  local  and 
regional trade.  
 
In June of 2005, the Government of Malawi announced that it would take an innovative 
approach to management of the food shortage by using a SAFEX white maize put option 
contract. (SAFEX is the South Africa Exchange Market). In response to a direct request from 
Government, the World Bank provided technical assistance to support this operation.  
 
Because government was concerned not only about price increases but also about logistics 
constraints and delivery performance, the call option contract was customized as an OTC 
contract which would give more flexibility than a standard financial instrument. First, price 
protection was provided on a delivered basis, thus combining the SAFEX price for white 
maize plus transport costs to Malawi. Second, the option contract carefully specified terms 
for physical settlement so that it could be used as a contingent import strategy if needed.  
Uncertainty  about  the  extent  of  the  food  shortage,  levels  of  commercial  imports, 
transportation  constraints,  performance  of  local  traders,  the  humanitarian  response,  and 
efficiency of procurement processes made the contingent import aspect of the contract very 
attractive to the government.   
 
In September 2005, the Government of Malawi concluded an agreement with a commercial 
bank  to  provide  risk  management  using  the  OTC  call  option  structure.  The  contract 
represented one of the first-ever instances of macro level hedging by an African government. 
It covered imports of 60,000 tons of white maize, had a total value of approximately $17 
million,  and  a  premium  payment  of  $1.53  million.  The  UK  development  agency  DfID 
provided budget support to the Government of Malawi for purchase of the contract.  
 
Throughout November and December, 2005 as prices increased and the food shortage grew 
more severe, the government exercised the call option, elected for physical settlement, and 
allocated the majority of the maize to humanitarian operations. The maize purchased through 
the  option  contract  had  a  superior  delivery  performance  to  that  of  other  procurement 
procedures. Over the delivery period spot prices rose $50-90/ton above the ceiling price of 
the contract following increases in the SAFEX white maize price and increases in transport 
costs. 
 
Currently  (2008)  the  Government  of  Malawi  is  evaluating  proposals  to  replicate  this 
approach.  Since Malawi is facing a surplus year this year but is uncertain about exports, the 
idea is to create a second layer of strategic  grain reserves held in country,  financed and 
managed by the private sector.  The Government will have the option to buy stocks if needed 
during the lean season. If stocks are not needed in country they will be exported by the 
private sector. 
 
This material is based on the work of Craig  Baker, Julie Dana, Christopher Gilbert, and 
David Rohrbach. 
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Exposure  to  possible  loses  by  stabilization  agencies  gives  rise  to  a  further  set  of 
issues. One approach is to argue that problems of this sort are inevitable with such agencies 
and that governments should therefore avoid stabilization commitments. This certainly solves 
the  consequential  risk  management  problems  but,  when  this  approach  is  advocated  by 
developed  country  governments,  it  runs  up  against  the  problem  of  “coherence”,  since 
developed countries clearly do support their own agricultural sectors by offering high and 
stable prices. If developing countries are to follow the same approach, they need to structure 
stabilization schemes in terms of collective savings programs which would operate according 
to the principle that disbursements would be constrained by the level of accumulated savings 
from  previous  years.  They  should  also  examine  the  potential  to  hedge  exposure  of 
stabilization  schemes.    Hedged  stabilization  schemes  are  more  likely  to  be  financially 
sustainable than unhedged stabilization schemes.  Box 7 discusses a recent proposal for the 
West and Central African cotton sector, set out in Rajadhyaksha et al. (2007), which goes in 
this direction.   35 
Box 7: Cotton Price Stabilization and Smoothing in West Africa 
 
Cotton is the major (often only) export crop in the arid areas bordering the Sahara. Major producers 
are Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Togo (all francophone countries). 
Cotton is input intensive and bulky to transport prior to processing. The francophone countries have 
traditionally operated the sectors through parastatal monopsonies. They operated in the following way 
·  Panterritorial producer prices were announced at the start of the crop year (around February). 
These  were  often  kept  constant  over  long  periods  of  time  or  moved  only  modestly  with 
changes in world prices. 
·  Ginners provided fertilizer to farmers groups, the cost of which was deducted from eventual 
sales revenues. 
·  They also sold forward to customers, including prior to the announcement of the producer 
price, with volumes depending on market conditions. 
·  In the event of high prices, part of the revenue was paid into a fond de soutien. In the event of 
low prices, funds was transferred to the ginner from the fond.   
·  If the price outcome was good, farmers would also be due a second payment. This was paid as 
a supplement to the following year’s producer price. 
 
Cotton prices declined steadily over the 1990s. With producer prices slow to adapt and political 
pressure to maintain purchasing power, the fonds de soutien became exhausted. Refinancing was 
required if the system was to continue. Donors were unhappy with repeated calls for replenishment of 
the fonds. The French development agency Agence Française de Developpement (AFD) proposed 
that the EU should launch a pilot project based on a “new” concept of fonds de lissage (smoothing 
funds) which would start in 2007 to be piloted in Burkina Faso. In the end, the Burkinabe adopted 
their own variant of the smoothing scheme. 
 
The structure proposed by AFD differed from the previous in the following ways 
·  Producer prices would be set on a formulaic and therefore non-political) basis based on prices 
over recent years (an exponentially smoothed average) and the contemporary forward price.  
·  Contributions to and support from the fond would be determined formulaically. 
·  The fonds would aim to use market instruments (OTC puts) to ensure that ginners can offer a 
producer price above the level of production costs. 
·  The fonds would not aim to protect against catastrophically low prices. Instead, donors would 
be asked to step in if such events occur.  
·  The fonds would have low initial financing, but a regional fond, perhaps the West African 
Development Bank, would provide second level support for the national fonds.  
 
The AFD objective was to smooth prices but not to stabilize at any absolute level. The suggestion that 
market instruments (effectively OTC puts) might be used to keep prices above production costs might 
be viewed as optimistic given liquidity in the OTC cotton options market and the substantial basis 
risk between West African cotton and NYBOT cotton prices, but is worth testing in the market. At 
the same time, price smoothing would not eliminate the requirement for ginners to manage residual 
intra-annual  price  exposure,  not  covered  by  likely  payments  from  the  fonds,  arising  out  of  their 
commitment to pay the agreed formulaic producer price. The extent of this residual exposure depends 
on when and how contributions from the fonds is decided and the extent to which the fonds can 
guarantee to compensate ginners for shortfalls in the price relative to that underlying the formulaic 
producer price.   36 
   
5.  Concluding Comments 
The market approach to commodity price management was born as a response both to the 
difficulties  encountered  by  international  and  national  price  stabilization  schemes  and  to 
problems  perceived  to  have  arisen  out  of  the  liberalization  of  agricultural  market  supply 
chains, which was in part itself a response to those difficulties. Liberalization had the effect 
of increasing the extent and speed of pass-through. The effects of volatility amplification 
have been felt throughout the supply chain but, given that farmers are the residual claimants 
on  commodity  revenues,  most  acutely  at  the  farmgate.  This  volatility  generates  risk 
management problems. Failure to address these problems can have serious consequences. 
Different agents in the supply chain have evolved different responses to volatility. 
Intermediaries aim to hold the commodity for as short a time as possible to keep exposure to 
a  minimum.  Independent  exporters  often  aim  to  market  on  a  back-to-back  basis.  This 
eliminates price exposure at the cost of limiting the exporter’s flexibility in marketing and 
can often force these exporters to sell at a disadvantage relative to multinational exporters. 
Cooperatives have been among those intermediaries which have coped least well with both 
the increases in competition and price volatility. Many lack the expertise to evaluate and 
manage  their  risks,  a  problem  which  is  exacerbated  by  cumbersome  decision-making 
processes which permit insufficient delegation for prompt response to market signals. 
Supply chain actors located in developed country offset commodity price risk using 
commodity  futures.  Access  to  these  instruments  is  more  difficult  for  actors  located  in 
developing  countries.  An  adequate  line  of  margin  credit  in  a  convertible  currency  is  a 
prerequisite for taking futures positions on a developed country exchange. Many developing 
country intermediaries, including some governments, lack this credit. In such cases, they are 
restricted to non-margined options-based hedges with full up-front payment. While options 
are well-suited to hedging certain types of exposure – out-of-the-money puts for cooperatives 
wishing to offer guaranteed minimum prices and out-of-the-money calls for governments (or 
their agencies) wishing to cap the prices of imported food staples – they are less suited to 
other typed of exposure, in particular the wish on the part of intermediaries and exporters to 
lock in sale-purchase margins.  
Access is further impaired by regulatory requirements, which have increased as the 
result  of  post  9/11  money  laundering  concerns,  and  which  impose  a  high  fixed  cost  on 
brokers  wishing  to  do  business  with  developing  country  entities.  Often,  the  value  of  the 
business will be insufficient to justify these fixed costs. Finally, in some countries exchange   37 
regulations may actually prohibit use of financial instruments for hedging. Together, these 
credit  and  regulatory  access  problems  give  multinational  supply  chain  actors,  and  their 
developing country affiliates, a clear competitive advantage relative to intermediaries located 
in  the  producing  countries  themselves.  This  is  an  important  unintended  consequence  of 
market liberalization. 
Finally, basis risk, resulting from imperfect pass-through of world to local prices, 
implies that in some cases hedging will deliver a lower degree of risk reduction to developing 
country supply chain actors than to those in the developed economies. The combination of 
poor access and sometimes only modest benefits has implied that, with important exceptions, 
developing  country  entities  typically  make  only  limited  use  of  developed  country  risk 
management  markets.  This  is  particularly  true  of  farmers,  since  efforts  to  transmit  the 
favorable impacts of risk management to the farmgate face very considerable difficulties. The 
poorest farmers, and these include most of the African agricultural community, continue to 
rely on crop diversification together with informal family and community-based risk sharing 
mechanisms in the event of serious adverse shocks – what Dercon (2005) calls risk-coping 
behavior. 
The consequence of access limitations varies from commodity to commodity. Farmers 
are  concerned  both  about  the  possible  intra-year  variability  of  prices,  in  particular  the 
possibility that the price may fall over the course of the crop year, and the absolute level of 
prices. The risk management tools discussed in this chapter deal with the former problem but 
not  the  latter  –  locking  in  a  low  export  price,  or  a  high  food  import  price,  eliminates 
uncertainty but does not impinge on the distress caused by the price level. The intra-annual 
price risk problem is most serious for annual crops, where farmers must decide how much to 
plant, and for commodities which are highly input intensive, where farmers must decide how 
much input to purchase on credit. Cotton and hybrid maize are commodities which fall into 
this category. At the other extreme, tree crop commodities do not require annual decisions on 
planting and in many cases production requires only low levels of inputs (often insecticides to 
control disease). In this type of environment, although farmers would prefer price certainty, it 
is the level of the price that is their major concern. Issues of this sort are addressed through 
the stabilization or “price smoothing” agenda. Stabilization should be seen as a saving and 
dissaving activity and addressed as such. This is different from price risk management and 
may exacerbate the risk management problem faced by supply chain intermediaries. To the 
extent that potential losses of stabilization authorities fall onto governments or donors, they 
compound these risk management problems.   38 
Price risk management techniques have the potential to improve the functioning of the 
agricultural supply chain in developing economies. Many countries still lack expertise on 
market-based approaches to managing risk. An important first step, which is simple, is to 
apply modern financial techniques for identifying and quantifying risk, and monitoring price 
exposure throughout the course of the season.  A second step is to establish the type of risk 
management monitoring and reporting functions which are standard to profitable commodity 
trading businesses and the banks that lend to them.  The third step is managing price risk, and 
as we have seen, solutions will vary and will need to be highly customized to specific market 
conditions,  which  change.  Finally,  improved  access  to  risk  management  instruments  is 
necessary, and this, in turn, need to be more appropriate to developing country requirements. 
The experience accumulated over the past two decades of liberalized markets in developing 
country export crops allow us to see the directions which are likely to generate the greatest 
returns. 
Intermediaries based in many of the poorest countries, including much of Africa, will 
continue to experience difficulties for the foreseeable future. In a discussion of these issues 
some  years  ago  one  of  us  wrote  that  risk  management  and  credit  issues  are  inextricably 
intertwined: “My belief is that, in the context of developing-country farmers, commodity risk 
management techniques will, on the main, come to be seen as part of the means in which 
rural credit can be developed and extended, rather than as a stand alone panacea” (Gilbert, 
2002, p.67) That judgment remains valid can be extended throughout the entire developing 
commodity country supply chains.  
At the same time, it has become clear that market liberalization and privatization of 
parastatal operatives does not eliminate government exposure to price risk. This is acutely 
evident  in  the  current  food  crisis.  Price  risk  management  becomes  an  important  tool  for 
governments  who  wish  to  avoid  the  adverse  budgetary  impact  of  interventions  either  to 
support export prices or cap import prices.  
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